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Response to my Commentator 
 
ROBERT C. PINTO 
 
Centre for Research on Reasoning, Argument and Rhetoric 






In his thoughtful comments Scott reads me as holding an “ecumenical epistemic 
theory of argument” on two fronts. 
First, from the fact that I formulate the issues that arise in epistemic 
approaches to argument in terms of the concept “reasonable” rather than in terms of 
“epistemic justification” he concludes I hold that  
 
the contentious issue of the nature of epistemic justification needn’t be inherited by 
[my] epistemic theory of argument.  
 
Such a reading of my view is, I think, misleading. Much of what I’ve written in the 
last 7 years has been devoted to spelling out in detail when and why it is reasonable 
to adopt one or another cognitive attitude toward a propositional content – a task 
that is quite analogous to that of addressing “the contentious issue of the nature of 
epistemic justification.” For example, Pinto (2006) attempts to develop a detailed 
account of argument evaluation and of the warrants to which such evaluation must 
revert: it defends a qualitative version of evidence proportionism that does not does 
not to my knowledge repeat anything else that has appeared in the epistemological 
literature to date. Again, Pinto (2009) is an extended account of what makes 
something a reason, and suggests (p. 291) that that, if we can deal with the threat of 
an infinite regress of reasons, we might equate its being reasonable to adopt an 
attitude A toward a propositional content with having a good reason all things 
considered to adopt that attitude. Moreover, the paper suggests (in notes 26 and 27 
on p. 290) how certain “internalist” moves suggested in Pollock (1995) and Pryor 
(2005) might enable us to deal with the threat of infinite regress.  
 Secondly, Aiken suggests my view is “is ecumenical with the other theories of 
argument”. He writes: 
 
Given that argument may have a variety of goals and our evaluation of it may take 
on the breadth of that variety, epistemic objectives with argument are the ones 
Pinto holds are “most interesting,” but are nevertheless [just one] among other 
objectives.  
 
Aikin is quite correct that my view is “ecumenical” in this respect. 
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